FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION: MULTIPLE
DEDUCTIONS ALLOWED UNDER SECTION
2055 FOR ONE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION
In an interpretation of Internal Revenue Code section
2055(b)(2) the Third Circuit in Estate of Miller v.
Commissioner has allowed a marital and charitable deduction
to the donor of a life estate with a power of appointment and
a charitable deduction to the estate of the surviving spouse,
although charity received only one contribution. This note
analyzes the court's decision in reference to the legislative
history of section 2055(b)(2) and to the relationship of section
2055 to section 2056. Additionally, suggestions are made
concerning the revision of section 2055(b)(2) so as to more
clearly reflect the original congressional intent in enacting that
section.

T he

estate tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code allow
deductions from the gross estate for property donated to
charity and for property left to the surviving spouse.! In what is
apparently the first judicial examination of Internal Revenue Code
section 2055(b)(2), the Third Circuit decision in Estate of Miller v.
Commissione? has allowed not only a marital deduction and a
charitable deduction to the donor of a life estate with a power $of
appointment but also a charitable deduction to the estate of the
surviving spouse, notwithstanding receipt by charity of only one
property interest. Because of the general statutory scheme of the
charitable contribution section and the probable congressional
intent in amending that section, the validity of the court's holding
is questionable. Section 2055(b)(2) and the Third Circuit's opinion
in Miller indicate a necessity not only for larification of the
section but also the need for particular scrutiny by Congress in
passing legislation designed to apply to a special case.

IINT.

REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2055-56. See generally C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES §§ 16-17 (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as LOWNDES &
KRAMER]; 4 J. MERTENS, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION §§ 28-29 (1959) [hereinafter

cited as

MERTENS].

2400 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1968).The Third Circuit consolidated for argument and decision

the cases of Estate of Edna A. Miller, 48 T.C. 251 (1967) and Estate of Hugh G. Miller, 48
T.C. 265 (1967).
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Edna Miller provided by will that her estate be held in trust and
that the income of a forty percent share of the trust corpus go to
her husband Hugh for life with a power to appoint the corpus "to
or in favor of his estate . . . or to any person or persons." 3 Edna's
will further provided that if Hugh died without exercising the
power, the income from the forty- percent share was to pass to her
son for life with the principal at his death going to the Edna Allen
Miller Foundation, a qualified, tax exempt organization.' Within
one month following Edna's death, Hugh executed an affidavit,
filed with Edra's estate tax return, averring that he was eighty-four
years old at Edna's death and indicatirig his intent to include in his
will an appointment of the income from the forty percent share to
his son with a remainder, the principal, to the Edna Allen Miller
Foundation. Hugh died in 1962 and by his will exercised the power
of appointment as indicated in the affidavit. Edna's estate claimed
a marital deduction under section 2056 for the entire corpus of the
forty .percent share of her estate left to Hugh and an additional
charitable deduction under section 2055(b)(2) for the remainder
interest to charity agreed to in Hugh's affidavitO
The Tax Court held that Edna's estate was entitled to both the
charitable and marital deductions while Hugh's estate was not
entitled to a charitable deduction although the forty percent interest
in the trust property was includible in his gross estate under the
provisions of section 2041.6 In holding that Edna's estate was
entitled to two deductions, the court placed emphasis on the fact
that the literal language of both section 2055(b)(2) and 2056(b)(5)
allowed the deductions and neither deduction precluded the other.,
In regard to -Hugh's estate, the Tax Court held that 2055(b)(2)
precluded operation of 2055(b)(1) as to the same charitable
contribution because the former was a "special rule" in contrast to
3400 F.2d at 408.
4Id.
5Id. at 409-10.
"(a) IN GENERAL.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property(2) POWERS CREATED AFTER OCTOBER 21, 1942.-To the extent of any property
with respect to which the decedent has at the time of his death a general power of

appointment . . . such property would be includible in the decedent's gross estate
under sections 2035 to 2038 inclusive ...
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2041(a).
7 Estate of Edna A. Miller, 48 T.C. 251, 264 (1967).
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the latter being a "general rule"' and because the special rule
depends upon the fulfillment of certain conditions, some of which
depend on the affirmative acts of a person whose estate would
otherwise be entitled to a charitable deduction under 2055(b)(l)?
The Third Circuit chose to follow the rationale of the Tax
Court as to Edna's estate but overruled the Tax Court's opinion as
to Hugh's estate. In basing its opinion upon the literal reading of
2055(b)(2) and 2056(b)(5), the court expressly held inapplicable to
Edna's estate the "absurd results" and "double deduction"
doctrines.1? Additionally, the court refused to give weight to any of
the several suggested alternative interpretations of section
2055(b)(2) on the grounds that the statutory language did not
dictate one interpretation and that therefore the court should be
reluctant to accept any one appropriate scheme." In determining
that Hugh's estate could claim a charitable deduction under
2055(b)(1) the court held that 205-5(b)(2) and 2055(b)(1) were both
special rules, that one could not preclude the other and that the two
sections applied to the estates of different individuals which had no
connection except the purely formalistic requirements of section
12
6503(e).
The legislative framework involved in allocating the proper
deductions to the estates of Hugh and Edna includes sections 2055
and 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code. In general, section 2055
allows, for property transferred to charity, a charitable deduction
to the estate of the deceased in whose gross estate the property was
includible. Section 2055(a) provides that the value of the gross
estate shall be reduced by the amount of all bequests, legacies,
devises or transfers to charitable organizations. This deduction also
includes an interest which "falls into" such a bequest, legacy,
devise, or transfer, by virtue of a disclaimer by the recipient of
property from the deceased. 3 Likewise, section 2055(b)(1) allows a
Estate of Hugh G. Miller, 48 T.C. 265, 269-70 (1967).

Id. at 270.
10400 F.2d at 411. For explanation of "absurd results" and "double deduction" doctrines
see notes 22-23 infra and accompanying text.
"400 F.2d at411.
1

Id. at 413. Amended in 1956 to correspond with the addition of 2055(b)(2), 6503(e)

provides for an extension of the statute of limitations on the first decedent spouse's estate to
thirty days after the filing of the surviving spouse's estate tax return when a deduction under
2055(b)(2) is claimed.
11INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2055(a). For a statement of the general rule of charitable

deductions in estate taxation, see 4

MERTENS

§ 28.03.
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deduction for property received by a charity which is includible in
the decedent's gross estate under section 2041 by virtue of a general
14
power of appointment.

Section 2055 was amended in 1956 by the addition of

2055(b)(2).15 This revision allows a charitable deduction, in the
special situation set forth in that subsection,"6 to the estate of a

decedent who leaves property in trust for a surviving spouse for life
and gives the surviving spouse power to appoint the property by

will in favor of charitable organizations, among others. As
indicated in the Senate Finance Committee report, section

2055(b)(2) was to be applicable to "certain bequests in trust with
respect to which no deduction is presently allowable."' 7 The
Committee report indicated additionally that the section was
intended to allow a deduction in situations which were not covered

by existing disclaimer provisions, such as a failure by the decedent
to name a charitable organization as the taker in default."8
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2055(b)(1). According to 4 MERTENS § 28.10, allowance of
a deduction for property received by charity where the property had been included in the
taxpayer's estate because it was subject to a power of appointment is merely an extension of
the general rule applicable to donations by the absolute owners of property since in both
instances, he is treated as owner for the purposes of taxation of the estate. LowNoes &
KRAMER § 16.6, however, views section 2055(b)(1) as an exception to the general rule of
2055(b)(2). These authors apparently believe the general rule to be that the estate of the
owner from whom title to property is deemed to have passed is provided with a charitable
deduction. However, because the holder of a power of appointment does not have title
according to property law, they consider that providing the holder with a charitable
deduction is an exception to the general rule. These authors' statement of the general rule
seems unjustified since inclusion of property in a decedent's gross estate, upon which the
estate tax is imposed, is not based upon title concepts of property law, and under section
2041 the gross estate of a holder of a general power of appointment includes the property
subject to that power. The MERTENS line of reasoning has found judicial acceptance. See
Estate of William M. Lande, 21 T.C. 977, 989 (1954).
"INT. REV. CooE of 1954, § 2055(b)(2), as amended 70 Stat. 1075 (1956).
'6 A charitable deduction is available to the estate of the deceased spouse only if (I) no
part of the corpus is distributed during the life of the surviving spouse, (2) the surviving
spouse is eighty years old at the time of decedent's death, (3) the surviving spouse within one
year of decedent's death executes an affidavit indicating an intention to appoint tle trust
property to qualified charities and indicates the amount each charity is to receive, and (4)
later appoints the property as indicated in the affidavit. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 2055(b)(2).
ITS. REP. No. 2798, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956).
11Id. The pertinent part of the Senate report stated: "This [charitable] deduction also is
allowed if an interest passes to such an organization by reason of a disclaimer made before
the date prescribed for the filing of the estate-tax return. In some instances, however, it is not
feasible for a legatee to allow a bequest to pass to charity by disclaiming it. For example, in
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Section 2056 governs the granting of marital deductions with
2056(b)(5) in particular providing for marital deductions where the
property left to the surviving spouse consists of a life estate with a
power of appointment exercisable at least in favor of the surviving
spouse or the estate of the surviving spouse. As can be readily
observed, the problem of one estate claiming both a marital
deduction and a charitable deduction for the same interest in
property would never have arisen before the 1956 amendment.
Until that time every section 2056(b)(5) power was either
disclaimed, and thus includible in the donor's estate but not
allowed 2056(b)(5) treatment, or the power was a 2056(b)(5) power
which was not disclaimed and thus not includible in the donor's
estate. 19 Section 2055(b)(2) raised the possibility of property subject
to a 2056(b)(5) power passing to the surviving spouse and thus
qualifying for the marital deduction while at the same time being a
basis for a charitable deduction from the donor's estate under
section 2055(b)(2). 0 Further, the language of 2055(b)(2) raised the
possibility of the same interest in property subject to a general
power being the basis of charitable deductions to both the estate of
the donor spouse and the estate of the donee spouse, if sections
2055(b)(1) and 2055(b)(2) were read literally. It was these
possibilities which the Edna and Hugh Miller estates were to test.
After noting the absence of any prior decisions on section
2055(b)(2), 21 the court proceeded to consider the applicability of the
doctrine of "absurd results" and the rule against double
deductions. In holding inapplicable the principle that a literal
interpretation should not be followed if it leads to absurd results,
the court noted its inability to find:
the case of a bequest in trust where the income is payable to the surviving spouse of the
decedent for life and the remainder to whomever the surviving spouse may appoint, the
holder of the power of appointment could allow the property to pass to charity by
disclaiming the power only if a charitable organization was named as the taker in default.
This would be the result even if the donee is over eighty years old and has a relatively short
life expectancy." Id.
" The power would qualify for marital deduction treatment under section 2056(b)(5) and
be includible in the estate of the holder of the power under section 2041. See note 6 supra.
21 The present case illustrates the mechanics of this literal reading. A marital deduction
was allowed for the value of the entire trust corpus which passed to Hugh. A charitable
deduction in the amount of the present value of the charitable remainder was also allowed.
Thus, the present value of the charitable remainder was valued as part of the marital
deduction and the whole of the charitable deduction.
21400 F.2d at 410.
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information from any source showing the purpose of subsection
2055(b)(2), showing its intended interrelationship with the rest of
the estate tax sections or showing that it can be analyzed for any of
the familiar touchstones of interpretation such as evil remedied,
object sought, etc.2
Viewing the rule against double deductions as a variation of the
"absurd results" doctrine, the court held inapplicable this second
interpretive tool on the grounds that there was no indication of
congressional intent to disallow double deductions under 2055(b)(2).
The court noted also that the double deductions rule had rarely
been applied outside the income tax areas of consolidated returns
and business losses and could not be used as a "legitimate canon of
estate tax interpretation.""
The second major reason for the court's decision to read
2055(b)(2) literally in order to allow both a charitable deduction
and a marital deduction to Edna's estate was its view that multiple
interpretations would be possible if section 2055(b)(2) were to be
read other than literally. The court indicated that these possibilities
included restricting section 2055(b)(2) to cases of a transfer of a
special power, restricting the section to circumstances in which a
charitable deduction could not be obtained through a disclaimer, or
limiting the section's application to transfers which exceeded fifty
percent of the estate of the deceased spouse.24 A further possibility
suggested by the court is that Congress deliberately intended to
allow both marital and charitable deductions for the same
property.2 After indicating the limitations of some of the possible
interpretations,2 the court concluded that because of the numerous
"Id. at 410-11.
23Id. at 411. In addition, the Third Circuit indicated that the doctrine of double deductions

was inapplicable to the present case because with respect to one "doubling" two separate
taxpayers were involved and because Congress had elsewhere acted explicitly to disallow

double deductions under both section 642(g) and sections 2053 and 2054. Id. n.12.
21400 F.2d at 411 n.13. Under section 2056 a marital deduction is available only to the
extent of fifty percent of the estate of the deceased spouse. Limiting the application of
2055(b)(2) to property transferred to the surviving spouse in excess of fifty percent of the
donor's estate would eliminate marital and charitable deductions based on the same interest
in property. The several restrictions on the applicability of section 2055(b)(2) considered by
the court were suggested by the Commissioner. Brief for United States at II, Estate of
Miller v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1968).
400 F.2d at 412.
26 Id.

at 411 n.13. The court indicated that limiting application of section 2055(b)(2) to

special powers, which would make the property transferred nondeductible under 2056, does
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possible statutory schemes, courts should hesitate to adopt any of
them as the only acceptable interpretation, particularly when the
provisions of the section were available to only a few people due to
the eighty year age requirement.l
In reversing the Tax Court's holding as to Hugh's estate and
thereby allowing his estate a deduction under 2055(b)(1), the Third
Circuit viewed the allowance of a charitable deduction under
2055(b)(2) to Edna's estate as not precluding a similar deduction to
the estate of the surviving spouse under 2055(b)(1).25 The court
viewed the two sections as applicable to two different estates which
had no connection except the requirements of section 6503(e).2 In
justifying its decision as to Hugh's estate, the Third Circuit refused
to follow the Tax Court's rationale that the application of the
"special rule" of section 2055(b)(2) to obtain a deduction
precluded application of the "general rule" of section 2055(b)(1) to
obtain an additional deduction for the same property contributed to
charity. Instead, the court reasoned that this was not the case of
the "specific" controlling the "general" provisions of a particular
section because "both subsections of 2055(b) were quite specific,
apparently dealing with narrow situations outside the 'general' tax
rule of subsection 2055(a)." 31
The Miller opinion stresses a literal approach rather than
attempting to determine the intent of Congress in passing
2055(b)(2). Although this approach would suffice absent evidence of
congressional intent, it is probable that the effect of 2055(b)(2)
contemplated by Congress was different than that given to the
section by the court. In holding inapplicable the "absurd results"
rule and the similar doctrine against double deductions, the court
was unable to determine any congressional purpose for section
2055(b)(2) or evidence of the evil sought to be remedied by the
not eliminate all double deductions because a power of appointment to a class excluding the
decedent and his estate, but including the creditors of his estate, falls within 2041 and
thereby qualifies for two charitable deductions, but outside 2056(b)(5). For the problems that

the court found in giving 2055(b)(2) application to only the amount by which the property
received by the surviving spouse exceeded the fifty percent limitation of 2055 see note 45
infra and accompanying text. For the difficulties that the court indicated in giving section
2055(b)(2) the effect of a disclaimer see note 51 infra and accompanying text.
2 400 F.2d at 412.

Id. at 413.
Id. For a discussion of the provisions of section 6503(e) see note 12 supra.
10400 F.2d at 413. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
21
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section 3 The Senate report on the section, however, indicates that
it was to apply only when "no [other] deduction [was then]
presently allowable. 3 2 Additionally, that report indicated that
section 2055(b)(2) was intended to remedy inadequacies in the
disclaimer provisions of 2055(a). The inadequacy indicated in the
Senate report and on the floor of the House of Representatives was
the failure of the deceased spouse to name the charitable
organization in his will.3 Such omission would have the effect of
disallowing a charitable deduction to the estate of the decedent,
because without a charity named in the will there could be no
disclaimer to a charitable organization. A final indication of
congressional intent is gathered from the single example used in the
Senate report, that of an eighty year old surviving spouse with a
general power of appointment as eligible to utilize the provisions of
2055(b)(2). If these evidences of congressional intent could be
applied in a consistent manner in determining the effect to be given
to section 2055(b)(2) on both the donor's and the donee's estates,
the Third Circuit's dismissal of the "absurd results" doctrine
would appear to be unjustified.
Two standards evolve from the above indications of
congressional intent which could have been used in applying
2055(b)(2) to the estates of Edna and Hugh. First, the example of
an eighty year old surviving spouse with a general power of
appointment indicates that Congress did not intend to restrict the
application of 2055(b)(2) to cases involving only a special power 3
The second standard which emerges from the indications of congressional intent involves viewing section 2055(b)(2) as having the
same effect as a disclaimer. Because the congressional motive in
passing section 2055(b)(2) was to fill inadequacies in the disclaimer
provisions, it is probable Congress also contemplated that the effect
31See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
S. REP. No. 2798, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956).
3Id.; 102 CONG. REC. 14295 (1956) (remarks of Representative Cooper).
Although the Miller court spoke in terms of special power of appointment versus general
power, the determinative consideration would appear to be whether the power at issue was a
2056(b)(5) power and thus includible in the donee's estate. The eighty year old surviving

spouse with a general power example in the Senate report would indicate that section
2055(b)(2) was not intended to apply to only non-2056(b)(5) powers.
"'Giving disclaimer treatment to section 2055(b)(2) becomes important in determining the
validity of the court's conclusion that there were many possible schemes of interpreting
2055(b)(2) and that to choose any one scheme would be unjustified. See text accompanying
note 48 infra.
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of the new subsection would be the same as a disclaimer, which
resulted in passing property to a charity under the decedent's will.
In essence, the subsection could be looked upon as an extension of
the disclaimer provisions36 and has been so viewed in at least one commentary.3 7 This interpretation is further supported by the language of
section 2055(b)(2) that "such bequest in trust . . . [shall be] deemed
a transfer to such organizations by the decedent." This language
indicates that the donor decedent's charitable deduction results from
a transfer of property directly to the charitable organization and not
from a transfer to charity via the surviving spouse. Thus, as with a
disclaimer, the property is viewed as passing from the original donor
spouse rather than from the donee spouse. Application of disclaimer
treatment to the power of appointment given by Edna to Hugh, which
was the subject of Hugh's later affidavit and will, would result in a
charitable deduction to Edna's estate but no marital deduction because the power of appointment left to the surviving spouse was in
effect disclaimed and the resulting life estate would be a terminable
interest which does not qualify for a marital deduction. Hugh's gross
estate therefore could not claim a charitable deduction under
2055(b)(1). Since this interpretation of 2055(b)(2) could have been
applied to the Miller estates consistently with the legislative. history
of that section, the rejection of the "absurd results" doctrine for lack
of evidence of congressional intent appears to be invalid.
The refusal to apply the rule against double deductions to this
case would also seem to be without merit. Application of an
interpretive rule against allowing two estate tax deductions for a
transfer of the same interest in property is justified not only by the
legislative history of section 2055(b)(2),11 but also by the
interrelation of the marital and charitable deduction sections.
The questions involved are whether both a charitable deduction and
a marital deduction should be allowed to Edna's estate for the
same interest in property and whether two charitable deductions
u See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
" Quiggle & Myers, Tax Aspects of Charitable Contributionsand Bequests by Individuals,
28 FORD. L. REV. 579 (1959-1960). The relationship between disclaimers and section
2055(b)(2) can be seen by the statement that "[a] charitable deduction results from a
disclaimer only if a charity is the taker in default. In 1956, Congress relaxed this rule in the
case of a decedent who leaves property in trust for a surviving spouse of relatively short life

expectancy." Id. at 609.
' See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
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should be allowed for the same contribution to charity claimed by
two different estates. Although the Third Circuit held the judicial
doctrine against double deductions inapplicable to the estates of
Edna and Hugh because cases have never before applied the double
deduction rule to the estate tax area,39 justification for applying the
rule to marital and charitable deductions can be derived from the
statutory scheme of the sections involved. Before the addition of
section 2055(b)(2) it was not possible for one estate to obtain both
a marital and charitable deduction for the same interest in
property." Likewise, no single contribution to charity could be the
source of two charitable deductions. The charitable deduction was
available only to the estate from which it was deemed to have
passed, either by direct transfer or as a result of disclaimer. Since
the same interest in property was not includible in two gross
estates, it could not give rise to two charitable deductions. In view
of this past treatment of charitable deductions and marital
deductions, a legislative standard denying not only a charitable
deduction and a marital deduction for a transfer of the same
interest in property but also denying two charitable deductions for
the same contribution to charity existed at the time of the passage
of the 1956 amendment, which added section 2055(b)(2).
The crucial point of the Third Circuit's decision involved its
view that in applying section 2055(b)(2) to the estates of Edna and
Hugh, any attempt to interpret section 2055(b)(2) would lead to
many possible interpretations and that the court would not be
justified in selecting any particular one 1 This approach would be
valid were it not possible to deduce from the legislative history an
interpretation that is consistent both with that history and with the
general statutory scheme of charitable deductions. The possible
solutions considered by the court lack such consistency. The theory
of restricting section 2055(b)(2) to special powers is inconsistent
with the example of a general power used in the Senate report and
in the discussion of the bill in the House of Representatives.43
Further, if 2055(b)(2) pertained only to special powers it would not
"400

F.2d at 411.

0See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
"1400 F.2d at 411.
4" See notes 33 & 35 supra and accompanying text.
43 S. REp. No. 2798, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956); 102 CONG. REc. 14295 (1956)
(remarks of Representative Cooper).

Vol. 1969: 1059]

SECTION 2055 MULTIPLE DEDUCTIONS

1069

be a "special rule" to section 2055(b)(l) because that section
applies only to general powers. Therefore, it must be that section
2055(b)(2) also applies to general powers.
A second possible scheme considered by the court, that of
interpreting section 2055(b)(2) as applicable to transfers to a
surviving spouse only when the property transferred exceeded fifty
percent of the estate of the deceased spouse, is likewise without
support. As indicated by the Third Circuit, this restriction appears
to be merely another scheme which can be hypothesized but about
which Congress has mentioned nothing." The Commissioner
supported this fifty percent restriction on the ground that the
phrase "no other deduction presently allowable" indicates an intent
to preclude operation of section 2055(b)(2) when a marital
deduction was available for the property,4 which proscription would
be lifted only when the amount of property transferred to the surviving spouse exceeded fifty percent of the decedent's gross estate.47
However, since Congress intended to give section 2055(b)(2)
the effect of a disclaimer as suggested above, 6 the transfer to
charity would be directly from the donor spouse and thus no
marital deduction would be available for the property. It would be
unreasonable to construe section 2055(b)(2) as operable only when the
property constituted more than fifty percent of the donor's gross
estate since in no case, let alone the limited case suggested by the
Commissioner, would a marital deduction be available for the
property. Given this meaning, there is no legislative language
to support restricting the applicability of the section to marital
transfers which exceed fifty percent of the donor's estate.
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2055(b)(l)-(2). For the view that section 2055(b)(2) is a
special rule as compared to the general rule reflected in section 2055(b)(1), see notes 58-59
infra and accompanying text.
'400 F.2dat411 n.13.
'6 Brief for Appellee at 16, Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1968).
'7

INT. REV. CODE

of 1954, § 2056(c)(1).

See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text. To the extent, however, that local law
allows a disclaimer of part of the property received by the donee, and if the Commissioner
and the courts were to uphold such partial disclaimers, the language "no other deduction
presently allowable" could be interpreted as applying to cases in which a marital deduction
was allowable but in which greater than fifty percent of the decedent spouse's estate was
originally received by the surviving spouse. The marital deduction would be available since
the surviving spouse could retain part of the property, while disclaiming the rest. For a discussion of the validity of partial disclaimers, see LOWNDES & KRAMER § 16.60.
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Another possible application of section 2055(b)(2) to the facts
of Miller involves a literal interpretation and consequent
double deductions which the court chose to follow. 9 Although the
court's interpretation is consistent with the language of section
2055(b)(2), it fails to give effect to congressional intent set forth in
the legislative history of the section. The court's opinion and
interpretation give no effect to the "no other deduction presently
allowable" phrase contained in the Senate report, other than to cite
it in a note. 0 Nor does the court give any effect to the Senate
report's indication that the objective of the section was to fill what
Congress considered an inadequacy in the disclaimer provisions of
section 2055(a). Presumably the court's reason for refusing to give
such recognition was contained in a note to the effect that if the
object of the section were to remedy disclaimer inadequacies, it
failed to do so because the inability of the deceased to obtain a
charitable deduction if no charitable organization was named in the
grantor's will as a taker in default was only one of the "tax art"
problems of section 2055(a).5' However, this reason for not giving
the disclaimer analogy any effect is not convincing since a failure
to fill all disclaimer inadequacies does not negate an intent to fill at
least one. Because Congress was concerned with disclaimer
inadequacies, it is probable that section 2055(b)(2) was intended to
merely extend the disclaimer provisions to the special circumstances
set forth in 2055(b)(2). However, it must be noted that this
probable congressional intent is less than clear in the language of
the section.
As indicated previously, a plausible interpretation of section
2055(b)(2) which gives effect to the probable intent of Congress, is
to view the section as an exception to the ordinary treatment of a
general power of appointment and an extension of the disclaimer
treatment 2 This approach would have the effect of giving Edna
Miller a charitable deduction for the remainder interest that Hugh
appointed to the charitable organization but no marital deduction.
This is not a harsh result, since, as compared to pre-1956 law, the
donor would have a charitable deduction which extends to all of the
4'400 F.2d at 413.
Ild. at 411 n. 13.
tId.
'ZSee text accompanying note 35 supra.
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interest that goes to charity rather than merely a marital deduction
which is limited to fifty percent of the decedent's gross estate.
In summary, it seems that the court's decision to read section
2055(b)(2) literally and to grant both a charitable and marital
deduction to Edna's estate is questionable in that no attempt was
made to determine and apply the intent of Congress. Furthermore,
it appears that interpreting section 2055(b)(2) as having the effect
of a disclaimer does manifest the intent of Congress and is
consistent with the legislative rationale of charitable and marital
deductions.
As in determining deductions available for Edna's estate, the
use of a literal approach in determining Hugh's estate taxes creates
a questionable result. The interpretation given by the court to
section 2055(b)(2) and the interplay between section 2055(b)(1) and
2055(b)(2) led the court to the conclusion that the trust corpus was
fully taxable to Hugh under section 2041 and that a charitable
53
deduction was available to Hugh's estate under section 2055(b)(1).
To reach this result the court was forced to conclude not only that
there was no connection between the estates of Edna and Hugh
other than "the bookkeeping provisions of requirement
(D). § 6503(e)," '' but also that a deduction under section
2055(b)(2) did not preclude a deduction under section 2055(b)(1).
As the Tax Court indicated, however, these observations do not
appear to be correct.15 The connection between Edna's estate and
Hugh's estate exists not only because both estates claim a
charitable deduction for the same contribution received by charity
but also because Hugh filed an affidavit under section 2055(b)(2)
indicating his intent to create the conditions necessary for Edna's
estate to obtain a charitable deduction. 56 It appears unreasonable to
award Hugh's estate a charitable deduction because he has carried
out the acts agreed to in an affidavit through which he manifested
an intent that Edna's estate obtain the charitable deduction.
In finding a lack of preclusive interplay between sections
2055(b)(1) and 2055(b)(2) the court held inapplicable the canon of
construction that use of a "special rule" tends to indicate that
0400 F.2d at 413.
" Id.
0 Estate of Hugh G. Miller, 48 T.C. 265, 270 (1967).
" The affidavit was filed pursuant to the requirements of INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 2055(b)(2)(C).
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application of the "general- rule" is prevented. In disagreeing with
the Tax Court, the Third Circuit held that both section 2055(b)(1)
and 2055(b)(2) were specific and dealt with narrow tax situations
outside the "general" tax rule of subsection 2055(a).57 This analysis
fails to state correctly the general rule applicable to charitable
deductions, which appears to be that a deduction is allowable from
the gross estate of a decedent for the value of property included in
his gross estate and transferred to charitable organizations by him,
including amounts deemed to have been transferred by him as a
result of an irrevocable disclaimer 8 Section 2055(a) implements
this general rule by giving a charitable deduction to the estate of an
individual whose gross estate included the property and who
transferred the property to charity directly or is deemed to have
transferred it due to a disclaimer by the donee of the interest.
Likewise, section 2055(b)(1) implements the general charitable
deduction rule because it gives the deduction to the person in whose
gross estate the property is includible. For estate tax purposes,
property subject to a general power of appointment is included in
the gross estate of the donee of the power. Section 2055(b)(2),
however, is a clear exception to this general rule. By virtue of both
the statutory language and its legislative history the section applies
to general powers of appointment; but rather than give the
charitable deduction to the donee, it gives the charitable deduction
to the donor of the general power. Therefore, it appears that
section 2055(b)(2) is a special rule whereas section 2055(b)(1) is
merely an application of the general rule. As a result, the court
could have applied the judicial canon of interpretation that the use
of a special rule precludes use of the general rule 9 This would have
the effect of disallowing a charitable deduction to Hugh's estate
because 2055(b)(1) would not be available for use.
The more reasonable application of section 2055(b)(1) and
2055(b)(2) to Hugh's estate would hold that the remainder interest
appointed to charity by Hugh would neither be includible in his
estate nor would it obtain a charitable deduction under section
2055(b)(1). 0 This results from treating property appointed pursuant
F.2d at 413.
58See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
5
1See Essenfeld v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 208, 210 (2d Cir. 1962).
61See text following note 33 supra.
57400
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to the specific requirements set forth in section 2055(b)(2) as if it
were disclaimed. Disclaimed property is not includib.le in the
disclaimant's gross estate pursuant to the terms df section
2041(a)(2) since a disclaimer amounts to a total rejection of the
power of appointment.6 ' Further, since a charitable deduction under
section 2055(b)(1) is premised upon a general power of appointment
includible in the decedent's gross estate, Hugh's estate would not
qualify for such a charitable deduction.
The Third Circuit's opinion in Miller has two implications. The
first pertains to the passage of "special legislation" while the
second concerns the clarification of the intended effect of
2055(b)(2). The court's characterization of section 2055(b)(2) as
"special legislation," created for the convenience of a special case,
is supported by both commentators 2 and the legislative history.
The emphasis in the Senate report and on the floor of the House of
Representatives on remedying inadequacies in the disclaimer
provisions, the very specific requirements of section 2055(b)(2) and
the retroactive effect given to the section all indicate that Congress
was concerned with a special fact situation. The particular case
probably involved a transfer to a spouse of a life estate and a
power of appointment in an amount greater than fifty percent of
the decedent's gross estate with a remainder to an unnamed charity
to be designated by the surviving spouse6 3 It is evident from the
result reached in Miller that before adopting legislation to rectify
inadequacies in existing laws, Congress should consider with
particular care the language used and its effect on other fact
situations. Furthermore, as the Miller opinion indicates, it is
desirable that Congress make clear the intended effect of the
language used to correct the inadequacy.
Although interpreting the 2055(b)(2) power of appointment as
equivalent to a disclaimer appears to be the most reasonable
" IINT. REV. CODE of 1954,

§ 204 1(a)(2).

12See, e.g., 4 MERTENS § 28.06 n. 17; 4 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFT
AND ESTATE TAXATION § 59.08 (1969); P. STERN, THE GREAT TREASURY RAID 46, 49-50,

292 (1964); Rudick & Gray, Bounty Twice Blessed: Tax Consequences of Gifts of Property
to orin Trust for Charity, 16 TAX L. Rav. 273,304 n.120 (1961).
61In this case 2055(b)(2), if given disclaimer treatment, would provide a greater deduction
from the decedent donor's estate than was available before 1956 by allowing a charitable
deduction for the amount appointed by the surviving spouse to charity. This amount would
be either all of the property received by the surviving spouse or the amount by which the
property exceeded fifty percent of the donor's estate, if partial disclaimers were allowed.
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treatment of the subsection and is consistent with the very small
amount of legislative history on the subsection, it is not certain that
this interpretation is what Congress intended. Further, the statutory
language itself provides little indication to the taxpayer that the
power of appointment will be treated as disclaimed for purposes of
determining the tax liability of the estate of the surviving spouse. If
the interpretation of section 2055(b)(2) suggested throughout this
article is acceptable, Congress could easily clarify the section by
indicating that for purposes of determining the tax liability of the
estate of the surviving spouse the effect of his executing the
affidavit required by section 2055(b)(2)(C) will be the same as a
disclaimer under section 2055(a). Absent such clarifying language,
the-Third Circuit's decision in Miller has the appeal of a certain
rough justice. Congress has permitted the situation to arise by the
enactment of special legislation, and it seems only fair that a tax
benefit in a statute of general application be available to those who
satisfy the requirements.

